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Over the past few decades, the foreign liabilities of the 
majority of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have grown 
dramatically, propelling most nations into the status of 
Highly Indebted Poor Countries, when these liabilities 
reached unsustainable levels in the 1990s. At the same 
time, increases in capital flight from the region followed 
a parallel trend, leading scholars to draw on “revolving 
door” models to explain the apparent positive covariation 
of external debt and capital flight in the region. This 
paper investigates the causality between external debt and 
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capital flight in a cross-section of Sub-Saharan African 
countries using co-integration and error-correction 
models. Although dual causality, which is consistent with 
the revolving door hypothesis, cannot be rejected for the 
majority of countries, empirical evidence highlights the 
lead of external debt over capital flight. The significance 
of error-correction terms points to a long-run co-
integrating relationship between external debt and capital 
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I. Introduction   
 
Over the past decades, external debt and capital flight have come to symbolize two faces of the same 
coin in the development puzzle. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the means and distributions associated with 
these two series have grown unabated, with the cumulative stock of capital flight markedly exceeding 
the stock of external debt in a large number of countries [Ndikumana and Boyce (2008)].2 While the 
dramatic increase in external debt is to a certain extent understandable, especially given the 
recurrence of balance of payments crisis and external disequilibrium in the majority of low-income 
countries faced with negative terms of trade shocks, the sustained increases of capital flight— the 
voluntary exit of private residents’ own capital either for safe haven or for investment made in 
foreign currency— is less obvious; in part because the majority of developing countries confronted 
with massive outflows of resources are also highly capital-scarce.   
 
The covariation of external debt and capital flight, reflected in concurrent increases in the two series, 
is neither new nor restricted to the Sub-Saharan African region, however. At the height of the debt 
crisis that emerged from the near insolvency status of many countries in Latin America in the 1980s, 
and later posed a major threat to the international financial system, Nicolas Brady, then US Treasury 
Secretary, recommended that measures contemplated by international financial institutions to address 
that crisis “placed special emphasis on the design of new policies that could stem and indeed reverse capital flight” 
[Pastor (1990)].3 Naturally, the underlying assumption of this policy prescription is the existence of a 
possible one-to-one correspondence between the rising stock of external debt and capital flight. 
Implicitly, it suggests that the latter may be driving the former, a scenario that a growing strand of the 
literature has characterized as ‘revolving door’ or ‘round tripping’ [Pastor (1990), Boyce (1992)]. 
 
Although the correlation between capital flight and external debt may not necessarily be perfect, it is 
difficult to rule out a priori the existence of a positive association. Under this time-dependent 
relationship, massive outflow of resources in the form of capital flight may continuously fuel the debt 
cycle; alternatively resource inflows in the form of external debt may provide the foreign reserves 
needed to sustain capital flight under the “round tripping” or “revolving door” hypothesis.  
 
Take two extreme cases of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, Botswana, one of the few non-HIPC 
countries in the region, with a very low external debt-to-GDP ratio, and at the other end of the 
spectrum, the Congo Republic, which had a very high external debt-to-GDP ratio prior to reaching 
the Completion Point under the Enhanced HIPC Initiative.4 In spite of the very similar initial 
conditions of these two countries—relatively small population size and natural-resources rich— they 
have followed a divergent path on the foreign liabilities landscape. While the Congo Republic has a 
debt-to-GDP ratio averaging 155 percent and a cumulative stock of flight capital to GDP in excess 
                                                 
2 In particular, capital flight has grown more rapidly than external debt in the region, resulting in net outflows 
of resources. Recent estimates suggest that capital flight has increased even more rapidly, and would account 
for over twice the size of external debt. Reflecting this emerging trend, a growing number of scholars have 
labeled the Sub-Saharan Africa region as “net creditor” to the rest of the world [Boyce and Ndikumana (2001)].  
3 Under this plan, the repatriation of capital flight to source countries in was the cornerstone of the debt 
strategy in Latin America. This strategy was also accompanied by stabilization programs, and as such, access to 
debt relief under IMF programs was conditional on successful repatriation of capital flight, among other 
criteria. However, under the Enhanced HIPC Initiative, which took a large number of Sub-Saharan African 
countries to the Completion Point, debt relief is not conditional upon repatriation of flight capital, and might 
undermine prospects of capital infusion in support for long-run growth [Fofack and Ndikumana (2009)].    
4 The Congo Republic external debt amounted to US$9 billion in 2004 (in NPV terms), which makes it one of 
the world’s most indebted countries on a per capita basis. It reached the Completion Point under the Enhanced 
HIPC in 2006, and was granted debt relief equivalent to US$1.7 billion in 2004 NPV terms under that initiative.   3
of 402 percent, Botswana exhibits some of the lowest ratios— about 5 percent for external debt-to-
GDP and negative 11 percent for capital flight-to-GDP.5  
 
The negative value of the capital flight to GDP ratio in Botswana reflects the fact that the uses of 
foreign exchange actually exceed the recorded sources (net inflows of capital and repatriation). On 
the other hand, the positive sign and scope of flight capital in the Congo Republic reflects excess 
capital flight where actual outflows of foreign reserves exceed effectively recorded ones. Interestingly, 
capital flight, which increased dramatically to account for over twice the size of foreign liabilities, 
when imputed interest earnings are accounted for, is associated with a rapid accumulation of external 
borrowings in the Congo Republic. The parallel increase of these two series does indeed suggest the 
existence of a positive correlation between external debt and capital flight. However, this positive 
correlation might not necessarily imply causation.  
 
Since the Latin American debt crisis, the causality between capital flight and external debt has been 
the subject of numerous studies and research. These studies have largely been approached from the 
conceptual and theoretical angle, highlighting four possible direct causal linkages whereby debt could 
either drive or fuel capital flight and vice versa [Boyce (1992) and Ajayi (1997)].6 In an attempt to 
empirically test this hypothesis, Boyce (1992) uses regression analysis in a model that allows 
simultaneity to investigate the determinants of capital flight and external debt in the Philippines.7  
 
Similarly, Ajayi (1997) hypothesizes the existence of dual causality between capital flight and external 
debt in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, more recent techniques and test of causality have not been 
used to assess the validity of the hypothesized dual causality in Sub-Saharan Africa. In order to 
complement these studies, this paper uses a methodological approach based on the theory of 
cointegration and Granger causality to investigate the causality between external debt and capital 
flight in a cross-section of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
The application of the error correction Granger causality model to the time series supports the 
existence of a causal relationship between external debt and capital flight in Sub-Saharan Africa. In 
particular, the results show that external debt and capital flight are co-integrated in the majority of 
countries, with past values of external debt having explanatory power over capital flight in most 
countries. This result further supports the established “round tripping” hypothesis. However, the 
reverse causality from capital flight to external debt is equally strong in a number of countries, 
especially when the standard Granger causality model is adjusted for error correction, pointing to the 
existence of a possible dual causality between capital flight and external debt in a large number of 
countries.  
 
This causal relationship is also supported by nonparametric tests. In particular, the one-sided 
alternative under the Spearman Rank Correlation test easily rejects the null hypothesis of 
independence in favor of the alternative direct association whereby large values of capital flight are 
likewise associated with large values of external debt. This last result implies that the ordered 
sequence of external debt and capital flight is not random. Non-randomness implies dependency 
where there is a strong tendency towards co-movements with the distributions underlying the two 
series following the same trend.  
                                                 
5 See Table 1 in the Annex for more details. 
6 Note that a number of studies have also raised the prospects of indirect linkages, whereby external debt 
accumulation and capital flight could independently be driven by exogenous factors such as poor 
macroeconomic management. However, empirical tests do not support the independence argument. 
7 The model found debt disbursements to be a highly significant determinant of capital flight in the Philippines. 
In a reverse causality the model finds external debt to be significant and positively affected by capital flight, 
suggesting that capital flight is a determinant of external debt.     4
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section focuses on empirical analysis 
and particularly uses a nonparametric method to infer on the nature of the association between the 
distribution of external debt and capital flight. Section III discusses a methodological approach to 
infer on the causality between capital flight and external debt, with emphasis on error correction 
Granger causality models. Section IV discusses empirical results and policy implications. The last 
section concludes.  
 
 
II. Data  Analysis 
 
The external debt series is obtained from the World Bank Debt Table. The estimated capital flight 
series has been kindly provided by Ndikumana and Boyce (2008).8 This last series is constructed 
from three different sources: the IMF’s Trade Statistics, World Bank World Tables and IMF Balance 
of Payments Statistics. The need to reconcile these different sources to construct the capital flight 
series arises from the difficulty of gathering accurate information on capita flight as a result of 
widespread use of trade misinvoicing. The recourse to trade misinvoicing is partly motivated by the 
desire to evade customs duties, import restrictions and capital controls, and has, to certain extent, 
reinforced the illicit nature of flight capital in the landscape of global capital flows. Although labor-
intensive, the integration of different sources of information reduces the discrepancy between 
recorded inflows and outflows of foreign exchange.9  
 
The resulting capital flight series is very comprehensive in its coverage; it includes low and middle-
income, HIPC and non-HIPC countries, from a large cross-section. Though debt overhang and 
subsequent relief predominantly concerns low-income and severely indebted countries, capital flight 
affects both low- and middle-income countries in the region. Hence, the sample has 40 countries, 
accounting for most of the region’s foreign liabilities and capital flight, reflecting the inclusion of 
leading capital flight candidates in the sample.10 The two series are annual averages spanning the years 
1970-2004, included.11 In particular, they cover the decade that saw a number of countries accede the 
HIPC Completion Point. In this regard, they provide the basis for assessing the dynamics of capital 
flight during the HIPC era. Additionally, the comprehensive coverage makes it possible to investigate 
the dynamics of capital flight across region, controlling for external debt.  
 
This section focuses on the dynamics and dependency structure of capital flight and external debt. 
The empirical analysis assumes that the movements underlying these two series follow a bivariate 
distribution symbolizing the two faces of the same coin. Though this assumption of time-invariant 
pairing may appear as relatively strong, I would propose that we abide by it for now and then subject 
the coin to tossing; so that we can explore the dynamics interaction or path-dependency of the two 
series using graphical and nonparametric methods. The graphical method draws on a scatter plot 
diagram to assess the nature of the association between the two series. In contrast, inference from 
nonparametric methods is based on the Spearman Rank Correlation test, which does not necessarily 
require imposing any functional distribution to the data [Gibbons (1996)]. This test assesses whether 
the two series are dependent or alternatively not identically distributed. 
                                                 
8 This new series is based on a more refined methodology which adjusts the change in external debt to account 
for debt write-offs within the Enhanced HIPC initiative. In addition, this revised series is adjusted for 
underreporting of remittances. For further details on estimation, see Ndikumana and Boyce (2008). 
9 As a result of this discrepancy, capital flight is often recorded as errors and omissions in the Balance of 
Payments statistics [IMF (2006)]. 
10 For instance, the 40 countries account for more than 96 percent of total stock of external debt owed by the 
region to the rest of the world. The sample selection is due to limited data. The few countries not sampled 
include: Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mayotte, Namibia and Somalia. 
11However, there are sample variations across countries which result in an unbalanced design.   5
 
Naturally the “revolving door” or “round tripping” hypothesis will hardly stand any test of validity if 
the distributions underlying the movements of the two series are independent and identically 
distributed. In theory, the independence assumption would imply that the distribution underlying the 
movements of capital flight, let say in the Congo Republic, would be the same, irrespective of the 
country’s debt profile, and the scale of capital flight unaffected by the distribution of external debt, 
including in the extreme case of complete absence of external liabilities.  
 
Intuitively, such a strong independence assumption would be difficult to defend. One just needs to 
look at the conditional distribution of foreign reserves given the level of external debt in any small 
country that is highly vulnerable to terms of trade shocks and is a price-taker in the global market. In 
principle, the risks of balance-of-payments crises which are the primary motivations for external 
financing in the majority of low-income countries are less likely when a country is enjoying a strong 
and growing reserves position. For instance, if  t R  and  t E  represent the level of foreign reserves and 
external financing in a given year t, respectively, then the distribution of foreign reserves 
conditioned on external indebtedness under the independence assumption can be represented by: 
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Equation (1) provides a functional representation under the independence assumption. Yet as a result 
of structural current account deficits and consistent with the symmetric argument—net international 
debt is the accumulation of current account deficit over time—countries which saw their foreign 
reserves base dwindle to a couple of months of imports often rely on external financing to maintain 
the minimum cushion required to secure the continuity of imports [Griffith-Jones (2007)].12 Hence 
and consistent with economic theory, this symmetric argument may actually contradict the 
independence hypothesis on both empirical and theoretical grounds.  
 
At the same time, the curve associated with the movements of capital flight followed a continuously 
rising trend, suggesting that private residents continue to increase their holding of foreign currency-
denominated assets, just as the reserve base was shrinking. Interestingly, the rising trend of capital 
flight in a context of deteriorating reserve position is consistent in HIPC and non-HIPC countries, 
though it is more pronounced for the latter, particularly from the mid-1990s onward (see Figure 1).  
 
In this regard, the sustainability of a minimum threshold of reserves depends on the accumulation of 
external debt, which increases the supply of foreign exchange needed to secure imports and holdings 
of foreign-currency denominated assets. In other words, though the functional representation of 
foreign reserves may depend on a host of factors, including productivity growth, exports 
competitiveness, real exchange rate alignment, it cannot be completely independent of external debt 
for small economies vulnerable to terms of trade shocks because these economies are generally 
undiversified and less competitive. This should further contradict the independence assumption.  
 
                                                 
12 In fact an empirical analysis shows that many countries saw their reserve base falls to less than 5 months of 
imports at the height of balance of payments crisis, which in principle should make it harder to increase the 
holding of foreign-currency denominated assets by private residents.   6
 
Figure 1: Stock of real capital flight per capita (in constant 2004 US dollar) 
 
 
            Sources: IMF, World Bank, Ndikumana and Boyce (2008).   
 
 
Figure 2: Cumulative external debt stock and capital flight  
(in billions of constant 2004 US dollar) 
 
 
            Sources: IMF, World Bank, Ndikumana and Boyce (2008).   
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Figure 2 plots the cumulative distribution of external debt (thick and solid line) and capital flight 
(thin and solid line) over their support. The two series are adjusted for interest payments and 
underreporting of remittances. In spite of the rapid accumulation of debt owed by countries in the 
region to the rest of the world, cumulative capital flight, though marginally smaller than external debt 
in the early 1970s, grew more rapidly and has been uniformly superior to the cumulative stock of 
debt, with the gap between the two distributions widening over time.  
 
The acceleration of flight capital is reflected in the curve of the distribution associated with 
movements of capital outflows. It has the steepest slope and curvilinear shape. In fact, since the 
1970s, the distribution of capital flight has grown unabated. Furthermore, the growth rate has 
remained strong and increased even more after the 1980s, despite the occurrence of negative spikes 
in a few countries (net inflows) and irrespective of the macroeconomic environment.13  
 
In effect the flows distribution reveals the occurrence of spikes of negative outflows (net inflows of 
capital and repatriation) in the early 1980s and late 1990s.14 However, these negative spikes did not 
affect the aggregate distribution of capital flight, as illustrated by Figure 2. Probably, the impressive 
and sustained growth could be due to compounded interest payments and to the fact that spikes of 
net inflows were confined to a limited number of years and countries. In fact, the reversal in flight 
capital was short-lived.  
 
The unrelenting increase may therefore also reflect the return to accelerated growth rates in the late 
1990s. In particular, capital flight estimates (in flow terms) between 1999 and 2004 are approximately 
US$90 billion (in constant 2004 prices), with US$36.2 billion recorded in 2003, the largest single 
annual outflow over the entire support of the distribution. An annual outflow of this magnitude 
suggests that capital flight remains a serious problem in the region and may undermine HIPC 
development effectiveness, particularly its potential for domestic resources mobilization in support 
of investments and economic growth. 
 
These risks of undermining the development impact in countries which have reached the Completion 
Point under the HIPC Initiative are all the more important because when the distribution of capital 
flight is controlled for external debt, it shows a contrast between low-income and relatively high-
income countries. At the lower end of the distribution, the countries with the lower debt ratios, 
which have relatively high per capita income, exhibit some of the lowest capital flight estimates. In 
fact flight capital is negative in a number of higher-income countries. At the same time the majority 
of countries with the highest scale of foreign liabilities are also saddled with a large scope of capital 
flight. This dichotomy at the continental level almost mirrors, and to certain extent generalizes the 
contrast between Botswana and the Congo Republic alluded to earlier. This contrast is illustrated by 
Figure 1 in the Annex.  
 
This figure provides a scatter plot of external debt and capital flight for these countries. A liner 
regression line is fitted to the scatter plot, with capital flight on the axis y  , and external debt on 
the axis x  . The increasing slope of this line supports the positive association between capital flight 
and external debt, with the two series rising concurrently. Even though external debt and capital 
flight are expressed as a percentage of GDP for cross-countries comparisons, estimates of real capital 
                                                 
13 For instance a close look at the distribution of the ratio of capital flight over external debt expressed in per 
capita terms shows a consistent increase since the 1970s, irrespective of the HIPC status. And the gap between 
the two distributions appears to be larger in the early 1980s and mid-1990s when countries embarked on the 
structural adjustment program, suggesting a deceleration in capital flight in low-income and HIPC countries.   
14 Interestingly, the spikes of negative outflows (capital repatriation) occurred in the early 1980s, during the 
initial phase of structural adjustment programs and in the late 1990s within the context of the HIPC Initiative. 
For further details, see Table 1 in the Annex.   8
flight are markedly above the regression line for the majority of low-income and severely indebted 
countries, suggesting that excess foreign liabilities is indeed correlated with higher rate of capital 
flight in these countries.  
 
In particular, Zambia, which acceded to debt relief under the HIPC initiative in 2006, is almost an 
outlier. It has one of the highest capital flight-to-GDP ratios and one of the highest external debt-to-
GDP ratios. Mozambique is another sampled country that mirrors Zambia, particularly on the scale 
of external debt. It has the highest ratio of external debt-to-GDP (over 170 percent). On the other 
hand, flight capital and external debt fall below the regression line for a number of countries which 
have lower debt ratios. In particular, Botswana which has the lowest debt ratio has interest rate 
adjusted real stock of capital flight estimates of about 50 per-cent of GDP. Interestingly, the few low-
income countries which enjoy negative flight and repatriation (Benin and Senegal) also have low debt 
ratios and are leading recipient of remittances.15  
 
More generally, the regression line fitted to the data under the linearity assumption points to a 
positive correlation between external debt and capital flight. The generalization of this apparent 
positive correlation between capital flight and external debt observed in the Congo Republic to a 
large number of countries in the region suggests a path-dependency. This dependency is further 
investigated by comparing empirical distributions underlying the movements of these two series 
using the Spearman Rank correlation analysis. The Spearman Rank correlation is a nonparametric 
test, which assumes that the data consists of n pairs of observations, ) , ( , ), , ( ), , ( 2 2 1 1 n n y x y x y x  , 
where the pairs  i i y x   and    are measured on ordinal scale and represent capital flight and external 
debt, respectively. Let  ) ( h  and  ) ( k  be rank-ordering functions such that:  
 
n i i i i u u u x h       1 u    with, , ) (  and  n i i i i v v v y k       1  v  with, , ) ( , then 
) , ( , ), , ( ), , (   ) , ( , ), , ( ), , ( 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 n n n n v u v u v u y x y x y x    . Inference from the Spearman 
Rank Correlation coefficient is based on the following rank correlation statistics: 
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This rank correlation is a descriptive statistic that reflects the degree of association between sample 
pairs of observations [Gibbons (1996)].16 And to the extent that external debt and capital flight are 
considered two sides of the same coin in the proposed experimental design, this statistic can be used 
as the basis for testing the existence of a possible association between these two variables. It varies 
between ) 1 1 (    R . When there is no relationship between the variables, they are independent 
and the movement of one of the variables has no effect on the other. In this case the statistics takes 
the value 0  R .  
 
On the other hand it takes a positive value when there is a direct association and a negative one when 
there is an inverse association. In the case of a perfect association, the statistic takes the 
                                                 
15 In per capita terms, these countries have the largest amount of remittances flowing into Sub-Saharan Africa, 
and the net inflows of capital or repatriation by private residents may simply reflect the scale of remittances in 
these countries [Gupta, Pattillo and Wagh (2007)]]. 
16 In theory and expressed in this form, this rank correlation statistics is exactly equal to the ordinary Pearson 
product-moment correlation coefficient in parametric statistics.   9
value ) 1 | (|  R ; and when  1   R  there is perfect disagreement. Perfect agreement occurs 
when 1  R .17 Perfect agreement means that large values of one variable are associated with large 
values of the other, and small values are likewise associated. For instance, under the present design 
excess capital flight would be associated with further accumulation of foreign liabilities either before 
in the debt-fueled capital flight scenario or after under the capital flight-fueled external debt 
assumption. Accordingly, this analysis can be applied to the data to test the null hypothesis of 
independence versus the one-sided alternative of direct association ) 0 (  R . Formally these two 
hypotheses can be represented by: 
 
  n. associatio Direct    :





The choice of the one-sided alternative of direct association is motivated by empirical investigation 
which suggests the existence of a positive association between these two variables. In particular, 
investigating the nature of the association between external debt and capital flight in the Philippines, 
Boyce (1992) find a positive association between net disbursement and capital flight, with a 
correlation coefficient in the order of magnitude of 0.70. Similarly the association between capital 
flight and external debt is positive in Sub-Saharan Africa, with an estimated rank correlation 
coefficient statistics of 9645 . 0  R .  
 
A value ofR this large calls for the rejection of the null hypothesis of independence in favor of the 
alternative direct type of association between capital flight and external debt. This result is further 
supported by the right-tail probability value of the statistics. In particular, the p-value in the right tail is 
less than 0.002, suggesting significance at the 1 percent level. In other words large values of capital 
flight are associated with large external debt; and smaller values of capital flight are associated with 
lower external debt in the sub-sample of countries. The next section provides an overview of the 
methodology used to investigate the causal relationship between the two variables.   
 
 
III.  Methodology and Estimation 
 
Let the time series  t K  and  t D  represent the stock of capital flight and external debt, respectively. 
The series  t K   is said to Granger-cause  t D  if the inclusion of lagged values of  t K in the 
conditioned information set, which has lagged values of t D results in a statistically significantly better 
prediction of  t D [Granger (1969)]. A priori, there is no reason to go against the underlined 
hypothesis of dual causal relationship. Existing studies have found that, on one hand, capital flight 
either drives or fuels external borrowing (flight-driven and flight-fueled external borrowing); while on 
the other, external borrowing either drives or fuels capital flight (debt-driven and debt-fueled 
flight).18 Under this assumption, short-run causality between capital flight and external debt can be 
assessed by running a two-way causality test on the two series. 
                                                 
17 Such association might be called direct because the variables are moving in the same direction. In an inverse 
relationship, the variables move in opposite directions—large values of one variable are associated with small 
values of the other, approaching perfect disagreement.  
18 Debt-driven capital flight refers to a situation where excess external borrowing motivates the intent of 
private residents to shift their own capital abroad to escape confiscation risks, inflation tax or outright 
depreciation in case of currency devaluation. Debt-fueled capital flight refers to a situation when borrowed 
funds are directly transferred abroad. Under this scenario, external debt provides the resources and motivations 
for capital flight. Capital flight-driven external borrowing refers to a situation when continued outflow of funds   10
 
There are many reasons why the hypothesized dual causal relationship may hold in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. After all, the shortage of foreign reserves in the majority of undiversified commodity-
dependent economies facing chronic balance-of-payments crises in the region is such that countries 
have had to continuously rely on external borrowings, in the form of official development assistance 
or private capital inflows, to secure access to foreign reserves. In turn this mode of deficit financing 
may enhance the acquisition of foreign-currency denominated assets via the capital flight channel, 
resulting in debt-fueled capital flight.  
 
At the same time, unceasing capital outflows from Sub-Saharan Africa may entertain current account 
deficits, and hence lock countries in the vicious circle of continued recourse to external indebtedness 
to bridge the ever growing financing gaps—the flight-driven external borrowing. Meanwhile the 
revolving door may also be self-contained in a uni-dimensional setting, especially in a context of 
unproductive public investments and when the growing cost of external debt services increases the 
demand for foreign exchange. 
 
Additionally, the causal relationship between capital flight and external debt may be reinforced by the 
asymmetric response of foreign creditors and private domestic agents to country risk. While the 
majority of foreign creditors extending loans to developing countries benefits from an implicit 
insurance coverage provided by government guarantee of automatic payment in case of default under 
the sovereign state doctrine of “governments do not go bankrupt”, private domestic agents in debt-saddled 
nations confronted with current account and fiscal deficits do not enjoy the same protection, even 
for licitly acquired assets. In fact economic agents in severely indebted countries face inflation tax, 
confiscation risk and real depreciation of domestic assets particularly when outright devaluation of a 
local currency is contemplated to mitigate external disequilibrium.19  
 
Furthermore, the implicit insurance coverage extended to external creditors may nurture the culture 
of moral hazard at the global level, especially when access to foreign reserves is systematically secured 
from international financial institutions by countries running large balance-of-payments deficits [Lane 
and Phillips (2000)]. Overtime the sovereign state doctrine and the systematic coverage provided 
under the international financial architecture have reduced incentives for foreign creditors and 
borrowing countries to take preventive measures against debt overhang. Ultimately, this option has 
only reinforced the sustainability of the debt-driven capital flight hypothesis.  
 
However, the asymmetric response of domestic and foreign creditors to country risks is likely to 
remain strong even outside the umbrella of the international financial architecture. Threats in the 
form of trade sanctions and ineligibility to foreign assistance are a powerful deterrent for countries 
which may be contemplating a default on their external commitments [Jayachandran and Kremer 
(2006)]. This asymmetry in the treatment of foreign and domestic creditors has been reflected in the 
accumulation of arrears to domestic suppliers by governments in the majority of countries in the 
region while remaining current on their external commitments, in spite of the direct economic and 
welfare costs of the former [Christensen (2005)].20  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
creates a financing gap bridged through external financing. Finally flight-fueled external borrowing refers to a 
situation in which domestic residents’ exported capital is borrowed back under the round tripping hypothesis. 
19 Over the years, devaluation has been at the core of stabilization programs implemented in low-income 
countries. In particular, the preference of this policy scheme has been largely motivated by its underlined 
effectiveness in reducing domestic expenditures and changing the composition of expenditures between 
foreign and domestic goods, as part of expenditure-switching and reducing measures [Rodrik (2006)]. 
20 In particular, domestic arrears have direct impact on output growth and domestic production. They also 
crowd out private sector lending when domestic debt becomes excessive.     11
More recently however, the concept of odious debt has been articulated in the economic literature to 
correct this asymmetry and align foreign liabilities with net benefits accruing to recipient countries. In 
the meantime, the asymmetric response of foreign creditors and private domestic agents to country 
risks, and the systematic bias in the treatment of creditors by developing countries’ governments 
have strengthened and even sustained the hypothesized dual causality between capital flight and 
external debt, warranting further investigation of a possible long-run relationship.  
 
In what follows we outline a four-step approach to investigate that relationship using cointegration 
techniques— modified standard Granger causality test. In the first stage, we apply the standard 
Granger causality test, which is designed to analyze bivariate weakly stationary stochastic processes to 
the joint distribution of capital flight and external debt.21 This test can be formally represented by the 



































          (4) 
 
If there is only a one-way causality, let say, t K (capital flight) Granger-causes t D (external debt), but 
not vice versa, then all coefficients i 2  should be statistically significantly different from zero and 
there should be at least one coefficient i 2  which is statistically significantly different from zero. 
Although capital flight may be motivated by other factors—such as interest rates differentials, quality 
of governance, institutions and development of the financial market—the proposed bivariate model 
focuses exclusively on capital flight and external debt relationships, and does not account for these 
factors. However, the significance of these factors is likely to vary across countries; and it is expected 
that the white noise error term in the above equation would capture the variation of capital flight 
(external debt) that is not fully explained by changes in external debt (capital flight). 
 
Despite the interest and various applications of this test, its suitability is limited when a time series 
has unit root because the transformation to stationarity by mean of a difference filter may alter the 
nature of the long-run relationship that is of interest [Agénor and Taylor (1993)]. In particular, the 
hysterisis in capital flight illustrated by persistent increases in capital outflows even in the face of 
improved macroeconomic environment— reduction of fiscal deficits and macroeconomic 
volatility— may suggest a long-run relationship and stability of the hypothesized dual causality.  
 
In the second stage, we apply a unit root test to the data under the null hypothesis of stationarity 
around a deterministic trend against the alternative unit root. We use the Phillips-Perron 
nonparametric test, which accommodates models with a fitted drift and a time trend to discriminate 
between unit root nonstationarity and stationarity about a deterministic trend. The test is applied to 
the two series across the 40 countries. Table 1 summarizes the results, highlighting cases where no 
cointegartion relationship exists between real external debt (RED) and real capital flight (RKF).22 In 
particular, when the unit root test is applied to the capital flight series, stationarity is present in only 
one country. However, when it is applied to the external debt series, stationarity is detected in three 
countries.  
 
                                                 
21 Note that the Granger causality test tends to be the most appropriate and robust test in a two-dimensional 
setting when the underlying data follows a bivariate distribution. 
22 See Table 2 in the Annex for complete results.   12
Table 1: Phillips-Perron Unit Root Test and Cointegration Test Applied to External Debt 
and Capital Flight 
 
RED RSKF
Angola I(1)+trend I(1)+trend Yes
Benin I(1)+drift I(0)+trend No
Botswana I(1)+drift I(0) No
Burkina Faso I(1)+drift I(1)+drift Yes
Burundi I(1) I(1) Yes
Cameroon I(1) I(1) Yes
Cape Verde I(1) I(1) Yes
Central African Republic I(1)+trend I(1)+trend Yes
Chad I(1) I(1) Yes
Comoros I(1)+drift I(0) No
Congo, Dem. Rep. I(1) I(1) Yes
Congo, Rep. I(1)+drift I(1)+drift Yes
Cote d'Ivoire I(1) I(1) Yes
Ethiopia I(1)+trend I(1)+trend Yes
Gabon I(1) I(1) Yes
Ghana I(1)+drift I(1)+drift Yes
Guinea I(1)+trend I(1)+trend Yes
Kenya I(1)+trend I(1)+trend Yes
Lesotho I(1) I(1) Yes
Madagascar I(1) I(1) Yes
Malawi I(1)+drift I(1)+drift Yes
Mali I(1)+drift I(0) No
Mauritania I(1) I(1) Yes
Mauritius I(0)+trend I(1)+drift No
Mozambique I(0)+drift I(1) No
Niger I(0)+drift I(1) No
Nigeria I(1)+drift I(1)+drift Yes
Rwanda I(1) I(1) Yes
Sao Tome and Principe I(0)+trend I(1)+drift No
Senegal I(1) I(1) Yes
Seychelles I(1) I(1) Yes
Sierra Leone I(1)+drift I(1)+drift Yes
South Africa I(1)+trend I(1)+trend Yes
Sudan I(1)+drift I(1)+drift Yes
Swaziland I(0)+trend I(1) No
Tanzania I(1) I(1) Yes
Togo I(1)+drift I(1)+drift Yes
Uganda I(1)+trend I(1)+trend Yes
Zambia I(1)+drift I(1)+drift Yes
Zimbabwe I(1)+trend I(1)+trend Yes
Unit Root Test Johansen Cointegration Test
At least one cointegration 
relation exists
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
   13
The presence of the unit root calls for the implementation of a non-stationary time series analysis. 
The co-integration theory provides the alternative to the standard Granger-causality test in the 
presence of a non-stationary time series. Co-integration is therefore applied to the data in the third 
step [Engle and Granger (1987)]. Let  ) 0 ( I be a time series integrated of order zero, and ) 1 ( I , a time 
series requiring first order differencing to achieve stationarity. In general, any linear combination of 
) 1 ( I  series will also be ) 1 ( I . However, if a linear combination of two series is also ) 0 ( I , then the 
series are co-integrated. In other words, if  1 x and  2 x  are each  ) 1 ( I  and the co-integrating equation 
represented by the sequence t t t x x z 2 1    , is ) 0 ( I , then  1 x and  2 x  are said to be co-integrated; 
and the co-integration parameter is unique when it exists.23   
 
The co-integration technique also provides a useful statistical definition of long-run equilibrium 
underpinning the movements of two non-stationary time series.24 In particular when the linear 
combination of  1 x and  2 x  is a stationary stochastic process, the two variables are said to be in a ‘state 
of statistical equilibrium’. On the other hand, when this condition is not met, the two series do not 
display any tendency towards direct co-movement, whereby large values of capital flight are likewise 
associated with large increase in external debt. However, if the tendency towards co-movement 
persists in the long run, then the series should be co-integrated with the co-integrating 
parameter 1   .  
 
In principle, when this condition is satisfied, short-run divergences tend to be eliminated by 
equilibrating forces, and the long-run tend towards co-movement is unaffected. For instance, the 
occurrence of spikes of negative capital flight under concurrent increase in external debt will not 
affect the long-run causal relationship between the two series.  In addition to testing for stationarity, 
the Phillips-Perron unit root test also provides information on the co-integrating nature of 
movements underlying the distributions of time series. This procedure is complemented by the 
Johansen test (last column of Table 1).  
 
Highlighted countries indicate non existence of a co-integration relationship. Consistent with the 
Phillip-Perron procedure, the Johansen test rejects the null hypothesis of non-co-integration 
relationship between the two series in 9 countries, further supporting the alternative existence of a 
co-integration relation in 31 countries. The co-integration relationship in the larger sub-sample 
implies that past values of external debt (capital flight) affect changes in capital flight (external debt). 
For countries falling in this category, the null hypothesis is easily rejected at the 5 percent level of 
significance in favor of the alternative co-integrating relationship.    
 
The presence of a co-integration relationship in a large number of countries supports the 
hypothesized causal relationship between capital flight and external debt. However, the non-
stationary nature of these time series calls for the inclusion of error correction term to the standard 
Granger causality test [Engle and Granger (1987)]. This correction is implemented in the last stage in 
the procedure. Consider a vector of observations on  ) 1 ( nI  time series, t X , which are co-integrated 
with co-integrating vector  , i.e.  ) 0 ( I X t    . Then, according to the Granger representation 
theorem, there exists an error-correction representation of the form25: 
                                                 
23 The uniqueness of this parameter is guaranteed only in the bivariate case. According to Engle and Granger 
(1987), there may exist up to n-1 distinct co-integration combinations among the set of n variables.  
24 Though, Toda and Phillips (1994) have found that Granger causality tests in error correction models suffer 
from nuisance parameter dependencies asymptotically and, in some cases nonstandard limit theory.  
25 Equation (5) provides an error correction representation of the standard Granger representation theorem, 
where  1 1     t t Z X   is a  1  r vector of stationary random variables.   14
 
t t t L X X L A     ) ( ) ( 1              (5) 
 
where ) (L A is a matrix polynomial in the lag operator Lwith n I A  ) 0 ( ,   is a  1  n  non-null 
vector of constants,  ) (L  is a scalar polynomial in Land  t  is a vector of white-noise disturbance 
terms. The long-run equilibrium solution to equation (5) is 0  X  . In the short run, deviations 
from the equilibrium will feedback on the changes in  t X  in order to force the convergence towards 
the equilibrium. If an element of the  X vector is being driven directly by the equilibrium error, then 
it is responding to feedbacks. However, if the  th n element of  is zero, then the  th n element of  t X  
is responding only to short-term shocks generated by the stochastic environment. Thus error-
correction augmented vector autoregression estimates allow a distinction between short-run and 
long-run causality.  
 
When co-integration is detected, inference from Granger causality is based on equations (6) and (7), 
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Equation (6) tests the causality from external debt to capital flight, while equation (7) tests the 
causality from capital flight to external debt. However, when a co-integration relation cannot be 
detected, the standard Granger causality test applies and there is no need for error-correction. In this 
context, the co-integrating equation is not included in the estimation set and ) 0 ( 2 1     . Still, 
estimating the parameters in equation (6) and (7) is facilitated by a prior knowledge of the optimum 
lag order in the VAR model. This optimum lag length of vector autoregression system is determined 
by minimizing the Akeike Information Criterion (AIC) [Akaike (1969)].26  
 
The results of the Akeike test procedure are reported in Table 3 in the Annex. The estimated number 
of lags is relatively low for a large number of countries under this criterion. This suggests a rather 
strong positive association between external debt and capital flight whereby time lag between inflow 
and outflow of funds is short, further supporting the debt-fueled capital flight hypothesis under 
revolving door models [Ajayi (1997), Ndikumana and Boyce (2003)]. Interestingly enough, the 
optimum lag takes on the value of 1 for the leading capital flight candidates in the sub-region 
(Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Cote d’Ivoire and Nigeria).   
 
 
IV.  Empirical Results and Policy Implications 
 
In theory, when the series  t K  and  t D  are co-integrated, the co-integrating term  1 1     t t t D K Z   
is stationary. The inclusion of this term in equation (6) and (7) differentiates the error correction 
                                                 
26 Though initially used in the context of estimating the optimum number of lags in vector autoregressive 
models, applications of the Akaike’s Information Criterion has been extended to the selection of regression 
models and to the estimation of the optimum number of components in a mixture density model for the 
simulated power data.      15
model from the standard Granger-causality. Under this modified alternative lagged values of  t D  may 
help explain changes in  t K  better, even if past changes in ) 1   , (      i D D i t t , do not. The choice of 
this alternative is motivated by the fact that the observed causality between the two series may be 
driven by trend uniformity in the two distributions. In principle, the probability of no causality 
should converge to zero when the underlying variables have a common trend.  
 
The scope of policy options increases under this alternative. In particular, the inclusion of the error 
correction term in the model expands the range of tests, from the two-by-two dual causality to a 
wider range of options.27 These tests account for the error correction term when capital flight is the 
dependent variable, and alternatively when external debt is the dependent variable and capital flight is 
part of the right hand side variables in the model. Inference is also based on joint effects, when 
assessing the combined effects of error correction and external debt on capital flight on one hand, 
and the effects of error correction and capital flight on external debt, on the other. In each case, 
inference is based on the F-statistics, which is estimated by comparing the residual sum of squares 
under the unrestricted model with the residual sum of squares under the restricted one 
 0 1   i   and 0 2   i   .28      
 
However, in the absence of a co-integrating relationship, the standard Granger causality test applies. 
Nine countries fall under this category. The results of the standard Granger causality analysis applied 
to these countries are provided in Table 4 in the Annex. They reveal the existence of a dual causal 
relationship between capital flight and external debt in two countries. In particular the F-test easily 
rejects the null hypothesis that external debt (capital flight) does not Granger cause capital flight 
(external debt) in these countries. The F-test results are shown in the first row followed by tails 
probability estimates (p-values) right below.  
 
The test is repeated up to the maximum number of 5 lags for each country. In Mauritius, the null 
hypothesis is rejected at the 1 percent level of significance in the fourth lag when the causality runs 
from capital flight to external debt. The results and direction of causality are consistent in subsequent 
lags. Similarly, the null hypothesis is rejected at the 10 percent level of significance when the causality 
runs from external debt to capital flight, suggesting the existence of dual causality between capital 
flight and external debt. Interestingly, these empirical results are consistent with the hypothesized 
dual causal relationship [Ajayi (1997), Ndikumana and Boyce (2003)].  
 
However, in a number of countries, empirical tests either suggest a unidirectional causality or fail to 
reject the null hypothesis of non-causal relationship. For instance the causality runs exclusively from 
external debt to capital flight in both Mali and Niger. Under this uni-directional alternative, the null 
hypothesis is rejected at the 10 and 5 percent level of significance in Mali and Niger, respectively, 
further suggesting that external debt Granger causes capital flight. Moreover, the relatively low lagged 
order points to short-run responses of capital flight following accumulation of foreign liabilities. This 
response rate is consistent with the debt-fueled capital flight hypothesis, whereby inflow of resources 
                                                 
27 The initial set of options for inferring on the nature of the relationship between external debt and capital 
flight would include the case where external debt Granger cause capital flight or fails to do so; and the reverse 
case where capital flight Granger causes external debt or fails to do so.  
28 In general, the F-statistics is derived from the Wald procedure using the following formulation: 
] ) 1 ( [
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
 , where SN denotes the total number of observations,  2 RSS  denotes 
the restricted sum of squared residuals obtained under the null hypothesis, and  1 RSS  is the unrestricted sum 
of squared residuals.   16
in the form of external debt provides the reserves and motivations for capital flight [Boyce and 
Ndikumana (2003)].29 
 
The error correction model is applied to the remaining nonstationary time series. This model 
accounts for dual causality and for the deviation from the equilibrium. More specifically, changes in 
the capital flight series  t K  from the previous period consist of changes associated with movements 
of external debt  t D  along the long-run equilibrium path plus the part that is due to deviation from 
the long-run equilibrium [Engle and Granger (1987)]. Inferences from this alternative model are 
based on the different hypotheses summarized in Table 2. While hypotheses testing in the first row 
refers to the case where causality runs from external debt to capital flight (equation (6)), test 
specifications in the second row refer to the reverse case when the causality runs from capital flight 
to external debt.30 
 
Table 2: Summary of hypothesis tested 
 
Based on Equations (6) and (7) 
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The first test (top and left quadrant) infers on the implications of the error correction term on capital 
flight; the second test (first row and second column) infers on the implications of external debt for 
capital flight; while the third test (first row and third column) focuses on the joint effect of error 
correction and changes in external debt on capital flight. Tests in the second row follow the same 
logic except that external debt is used as the response variable and inference is based on factors that 
Granger causes external debt to change over time. The results of these tests are summarized in Table 
3. More detailed results with estimated F-statistics and p-values are provided in Table 5 in the Annex.  
 
 
                                                 
29 According to estimates derived by Ndikumana and Boyce (2008), approximately 60 cents of every dollar 
accruing to the Africa in the form of external borrowing in the period 1970-2004 left the continent the same 
year. 
30 In the past most studies investigating the nature of the association of between capital flight and external debt 
have drawn on standard regression techniques whereby external debt (capital flight) are alternatively used as 
regressors in a set of right-hand side variables to identify the determinants of capital flight (external debt) in 
developing countries. For instance, Lensink, Hermes and Murinde (1998) single out external debt as one of the 
key determinants of capital flight in Sub-Saharan Africa. Similarly, Pastor (1990) and Mikkelsen (1991) found 
external debt to be a significant determinant of capital flight in Latin America.    17
Table 3: Error Correction Granger Causality Test Summary Results 
 
ECT       k d       k d and ECT       k ECT       d k       d k and ECT       d
Angola No No No No No No
Benin --- No --- --- No ---
Botswana --- No --- --- Yes ---
Burkina Faso No No No No No No
Burundi Yes Yes Yes No No No
Cameroon No No No No No No
Cape Verde No No No No No No
Central African Republic Yes Yes Yes No No No
Chad No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Comoros --- No --- --- No ---
Congo, Dem. Rep. No No No No No No
Congo, Rep. Yes No Yes No No No
Cote d'Ivoire Yes No Yes No No Yes
Ethiopia No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Gabon Yes No Yes No Yes Yes
Ghana Yes No No No No No
Guinea No No No No No Yes
Kenya No No No No No No
Lesotho Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Madagascar Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Malawi No No No No No No
Mali --- No --- --- No ---
Mauritania No No No No No Yes
Mauritius --- No --- --- Yes ---
Mozambique --- No --- --- No ---
Niger --- Yes --- --- No ---
Nigeria Yes No Yes No No No
Rwanda No No No No No No
Sao Tome and Principe --- No --- --- No ---
Senegal Yes No No No No Yes
Seychelles No No No No No No
Sierra Leone Yes Yes Yes No No No
South Africa Yes Yes Yes No No No
Sudan No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Swaziland --- No --- --- Yes ---
Tanzania Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
Togo No No No Yes Yes Yes
Uganda No No No No No No
Zambia No Yes Yes No No No
Zimbabwe No No No No Yes Yes  
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
 
The results support the existence of a uni-directional causality between external debt and capital 
flight. Uni-directional causality is present in 9 countries to which the error correction model is 
applied. The results are robust under the restricted model when the null hypothesis is considered 
with 0  i  . The null hypothesis that external debt does not Granger cause capital flight is rejected 
in the majority of countries in favor of the alternative which supports the existence of uni-directional 
causality running from external debt to capital flight. For most countries where causality is present 
the F-statistics is relatively large and the null hypothesis is easily rejected at the 10 percent level of 
significance or lower.      18
 
Additionally, the consistently positive sign of the coefficient associated with changes in external debt 
in the error correction model, even in countries where the null hypothesis fails to be rejected, further 
supports the existence of a direct association between external debt and capital flight. In fact the 
positive association detected from empirical analysis is sustained under the Granger causality test, 
suggesting that increases in external debt tend to contribute to capital flight acceleration. The signs of 
the coefficient associated with the error-correction term are also consistently positive and the null 
hypothesis of non-causality is rejected in the majority of countries.  
 
Likewise the null hypothesis of a non-causal relationship between external debt and capital flight is 
rejected when the joint effect is investigated (intersection of first row and third column in Table 2). 
Under the joint-effect, the null hypothesis assumes that neither the error correction terms, nor the 
changes in external debt affect the distribution of capital flight. This hypothesis is also rejected in the 
majority of cases (15 countries) at the 10 percent level of significance or lower. Moreover the signs of 
the coefficient associated with the joint effect are invariably positive. These results are consistent 
with inference from the marginal distribution, when the coefficients associated with error correction 
terms and external debt turn out to be highly significant.  
 
The unidirectional causality, whereby external debt Granger causes capital flight in the majority of 
countries highlights the lead of external debt over capital flight in Sub-Saharan Africa. In the past, 
this lead has equally been supported empirically. In particular, Lensink, Hermes and Murinde (1998) 
found external debt to be a significant determinant of capital flight when a standard regression 
analysis was applied to a subset of pooled data selected from the region. Under this lead, external 
debt tends to either drive or fuel capital flight in the region. Hence external debt may emerge as the 
heads driving the tails in the co-integrating relationship captured by the two faces of the same coin 
analogy alluded to earlier in the introductory section.31 
 
The significance of the error correction term under different modeling specifications, particularly 
when the causality runs from external debt to capital flight points to the existence of a long-run 
causal relationship between the two series. For the majority of countries, the null hypothesis is easily 
rejected at the 5 percent level of significance, implying that external debt does indeed Granger causes 
capital flight. Note that the error correction term allows the long-run components of co-integrating 
variables to obey equilibrium constraints under the alternative to the standard Granger causality 
[Engle and Granger (1987)]. The significance of the error correction term therefore implies that 
disequilibrium from co-movements tend to be corrected in sub-sequent periods.     
 
Similarly, the significance of the causality test holds when the modified Granger causality test with 
error correction runs from capital flight to external debt. The different hypothesis tests underlying 
this reverse causality are summarized in the last row of Table 2. Of particular interest are inferences 
of error correction term on capital flight. Under this reverse causality, the null hypothesis that capital 
flight does not Granger cause external debt is rejected in ten countries. Interestingly the power of the 
test is relatively large, and the null hypothesis is rejected at the 10 per cent level of significance or 
lower in numerous countries (see Table 5 in the Annex).  
 
However, there is some improvement when the restricted model is adjusted to include the error 
correction term. Under this adjustment, capita flight grander causes external debt in a large number 
of countries. In the remaining countries where the error correction term is not significant, the co-
                                                 
31 Ndikumana and Boyce (2002) provide a good summary and overview of various studies investigating the 
determinants of capital flight across the developing world using regression analysis. In addition to external debt, 
other significant determinants of capital flight include: macroeconomic environment, fiscal policy, risks and 
returns to investments, financial depth and political and governance variables.   19
integrated structure of the two variables suggests that external debt may be weakly exogenous. In 
particular, the signs of the coefficients associated with the right-hand side variables (error correction 
terms and capital flight) are all positive, further supporting the positive association, whereby increases 
in capital flight might be associated with or followed by a correlative increase in external debt and 
vice versa.  
 
These empirical results notwithstanding, causality does not necessarily imply a one-to-one 
correspondence between external debt and capital flight, however; a scenario which may single out 
foreign aid as the exclusive conduit for capital flight and implicitly assumes that the latter might have 
motivated the recourse to external financing in the first place. In practice the accumulation of foreign 
liabilities originated from the recurrence of balance-of-payments crises following succession of 
negative terms of trade shocks in commodity-dependent economies. Moreover, the excess of flight 
capital over external debt in a large number of countries suggests that the pool fueling the former 
may surpass the foreign liabilities landscape to include country’s own resources, raising concerns 
related to governance and accountability in the uses of public resources.32  
 
Intriguing still is the dramatic increase of foreign liabilities which have resulted in debt overhang, 
with tremendous economic and welfare costs, in the face of excess flight capital [Elbadawi et al. 
(1997), Pattillo et al. (2004)].33 In particular, the cycle of external indebtedness stifled economic 
growth without necessarily mitigating the exposure to negative shocks. Over time, the recurrence of 
negative terms of trade shocks locked the majority of countries in an infinite loop of foreign 
indebtedness. Additionally and by the established causality, the inherent vicious circle of external 
indebtedness fueled capital flight which further compounded the problem, dwarfing the limited 
resources from already capital-scarce countries. In fine, most of these countries found themselves 
caught in the debt poverty trap [Easterly (2002), Artadi and Sala-i-Martin (2003), Fofack (2007)].34 
 
Reflecting the prohibitive costs of debt overhang, the HIPC initiative was launched in 1996, and has 
since lowered the stock of external debt and debt service payments in a number of countries. 
Nevertheless, while accession to debt relief may broaden the government fiscal space, stemming and 
even reversing capital flight to effect massive investments under the ‘Big Push’ model may be 
essential to achieving export diversification and increasing fiscal revenue while at the same time 
raising the HIPC overall effectiveness [Dornbusch (1991), Fofack and Ndikumana (2009)].35  
 
                                                 
32 Indeed the countries recording the largest outflows of capital (Angola, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Congo Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, and Nigeria) have also topped the global ranking of 
corruption and good governance published annually by Transparency International [Sala-i-Martin and 
Subramanian (2003)].  
33 In particular, Elbadawi, Ndulu and Ndung’u (1997) provide a good overview of implications of debt 
overhang for economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
34 The macroeconomic and welfare costs of capital flight for low-income countries are significant, and have 
been documented extensively [Pastor (1990), Dooley and Kletzer (1994), Ajayi (1997), Ndikumana and Boyce 
(2003)]. In the short run, massive capital outflows are likely to undermine growth when private capital 
formation are delayed or simply hindered as a result of drainage of national savings. In the medium to long 
term, delayed expansion of gross capital formation and investment may cause the tax base to remain narrow, 
and even shrink in a context of assets decumulation, and ultimately undermine public investments which are 
complement or/and catalyst for private capital formation [Agénor et al. (2003)]. Naturally and to the extent that 
capital flight may encourage external borrowings, debt service payments will increase and further compromise 
public investment. Furthermore, capital flight may have adverse distributional consequences on the 
overwhelming majority of poor in low-income countries in that it heightened income inequality. 
35 In fact, a latest UN report concluded that capital flight was undermining growth and economic development 
prospects, and called upon African governments to consider a temporary amnesty to allow capital to be 
repatriated in support of investment and economic growth.   20
Already, reviews of HIPC are highlighting a rapid deterioration of external debt indicators in a 
growing number of post-completion point countries [Sun (2004), World Bank (2006)].36 In this 
regard, the established causality between capital flight and external debt may strengthen ongoing 
efforts to increase domestic resource mobilization and savings in support of investment and growth, 





In the face of long-run and persistent co-movements of capital flight and external debt, which both 
increased dramatically in Sub-Saharan Africa, this paper investigates the covariation and nature of the 
association between the two series, using nonparametric methods and Granger causality error 
correction models. The dramatic increase of these two series had significant implications for 
investments and growth in the region. In particular, they have been accompanied by sustained 
periods of economic downturns characterized by decumulation of capital stock and balance of 
payment crisis. Ultimately, they propelled numerous countries into a debt crisis in the 1990s, with 
many of them seeking eligibility to the HIPC initiative when their external debt became 
unsustainable.  
 
The focus on a causal relationship between these two series undertaken by this study could shed 
some light on the causes and origins of capital flight and avert another cycle of external indebtedness 
in countries which reached the completion point under the HIPC initiative. Indeed, the study spans a 
period of more than three decades and covers a relatively large sample of countries, including HIPC 
and non-HIPC countries. It is based on the most recent data on capital flight, and hence allows 
extension of the analysis to the HIPC completion point era, when a number of severely indebted 
countries acceded to debt relief.  
 
This framework also assesses the nature and the existence of a possible long-run relationship 
between the two series. This assessment is undertaken by first applying the Spearman Rank 
Correlation test to the data. The application of this test to the bivariate time series reveals the 
existence of a direct positive association between capital flight and external debt. The nonparametric 
rank correlation test rejects the null hypothesis that the distributions underlying the movements of 
the two series are independent and identically distributed, in favor of the alternative direct positive 
association. Under this alternative, the underlined co-movement of the two series is consistent with 
inference from revolving door models, especially to the extent that debt-driven or fueled capital fight 
or alternatively flight-driven or fueled external indebtedness require that the two series have a 
common trend.  
 
At the same time, revolving door models implicitly assumed the existence of causality and possibly 
dual causality. This assumption is tested using Granger causality error correction models as the 
Phillips-Perron Unit Root test reveals the presence of a co-integrating relationship in the 
distributions of external debt and capital flight in the majority of countries. While the null hypothesis 
of non-causal relationship is rejected, the error correction Granger causality test overwhelmingly 
                                                 
36 A review by the World Bank Independent Evaluation Group conducted in 2006, found that the key 
indicators of external debt sustainability have deteriorated significantly and quite rapidly in a sizable number of 
post-HIPC Completion Point countries. In some of these countries, these ratios once again come to exceed 
HIPC thresholds. This evaluation concluded that debt reduction alone is not a sufficient instrument to affect 
the multiple drivers of debt sustainability, and call for investment booms in support of export diversification, 
sound fiscal management, terms of new financing and improved public debt management. However, the 
success of these measures will be mitigated if fiscal and public debt management initiatives do not emphasize 
policies to prevent and reverse capital flight.     21
favors uni-directional causal relationship between the two series. In particular, the causality runs from 
external debt to capital flight in numerous countries. Moreover, the significance of the error 
correction term points to a long-run causal relationship between external debt and capital flight. 
 
However, though consistent with the debt-driven and fueled capital flight hypothesis, the established 
causality may provide only a partial explanation to the capital flight hemorrhage afflicting the Sub-
Saharan Africa region, especially, given the magnitude and the excess flight capital over the stock of 
external debt, and the continued expansion of flight capital even when external debt is controlled for. 
Additionally, existing empirical studies also highlight the hysterisis in capital flight in the face of 
improved macroeconomic environment and reduced volatility. In this regard and by way of 
furthering understanding of capital flight dynamics, future research could investigate the proportional 
variation of capital flight that is accounted for by accumulation of external liabilities and the 
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Annex Table 1 
Capital flight and external debt in a selected sample of countries 
(in million 2004 US $) 
 
  Cumulative real 







Ratio of interest 
rate adjusted real 
stock of capital 
flight to external 
debt 
Botswana  -1,087  510  -2.13 
Comoros  -169  309  -0.55 
Swaziland  1,343  471  2.85 
Mauritius  650  2296  0.28 
       
Congo Republic  17,475  6,741  2.59 
Zambia  19,814  7,279  2.72 
Mauritania  4,006  2,312  1.73 
Mozambique  14,273  5,047  2.83 
       
Total Sub-Saharan Africa  602,063  229,756  2.62 
 
 
Capital flight and external debt in a selected sample of countries 
(in percentage of GDP 2004) 
 
  Cumulative real 







Ratio of interest 
rate adjusted real 
stock of capital 
flight to external 
debt 
Botswana  -11  5  -2.13 
Comoros  -47  85  -0.55 
Swaziland  53  19  2.85 
Mauritius  11  38  0.28 
       
Congo Republic  402  155  2.59 
Zambia  365  134  2.72 
Mauritania  259  149  1.73 
Mozambique  241  85  2.83 
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Annex Table 2: Phillips-Perron Unit Root Test: External debt and capital 
flight
Ho: Variable has a unit root
Trend Constant None Trend Constant None
Angola -2.481655 --- --- -2.038318 --- ---
0.3304 0.5447
Benin --- -1.244601 --- -2.726865 --- ---
0.6434 0.2337
Botswana --- -2.091653 --- --- --- -0.466418
0.2491 0.5045
Burkina Faso --- 1.737063 --- --- 1.921801 ---
0.9995 0.9997
Burundi --- --- 1.255297 --- --- 4.251172
0.9436 0.9999
Cameroon --- --- 0.856181 --- --- 2.158127
0.8905 0.9912
Cape Verde --- --- 9.236547 --- --- 5.667501
11
Central African Republic -1.474567 --- --- -1.641428 --- ---
0.8188 0.7548
Chad --- --- 2.93742 --- --- 2.318406
0.9987 0.9935
Comoros --- -0.922768 --- --- --- -1.079184
0.7686 0.2457
Congo, Dem. Rep. --- --- 0.446515 --- --- 4.169401
0.8053 1
Congo, Rep. --- -1.009797 --- --- 5.360522 ---
0.7386 1
Cote d'Ivoire --- --- -0.125531 --- --- 4.742761
0.6331 1
Ethiopia -0.564419 --- --- 0.346134 --- ---
0.9749 0.9981
Gabon --- --- 0.0581 --- --- 8.550381
0.6945 1
Ghana --- -0.263587 --- --- 7.86694 ---
0.9202 1
Guinea -1.392546 --- --- 0.122564 --- ---
0.8451 0.9947
Kenya -0.74189 --- --- -1.942926 --- ---
0.9613 0.6104
Lesotho --- --- 1.254971 --- --- 0.494119
0.9436 0.816
Madagascar --- --- 0.037952 --- --- 3.93636
0.6881 0.9999
Malawi --- 1.796502 --- --- 1.283697 ---
0.9996 0.998
Mali --- -0.856305 --- --- --- -1.234002
0.7897 0.1951
Mauritania --- --- 0.554826 --- --- 2.716106
0.8311 0.9976
Mauritius -3.123478 --- --- --- -1.883081 ---
0.1172 0.335
Mozambique --- -2.479908 --- --- --- 1.965354
0.1348 0.985
Niger --- -1.754151 --- --- --- 9.662292
0.396 1
Nigeria --- -1.316088 --- --- 7.257378 ---
0.6107 1
Rwanda --- --- 3.250605 --- --- 4.109452
0.9994 1
Sao Tome and Principe -2.305087 --- --- --- 1.373816 ---
0.4173 0.9983
Senegal --- --- 0.322651 --- --- 5.888787
0.773 1
Seychelles --- --- 1.508935 --- --- 9.935726
0.9635 1
Sierra Leone --- -1.612453 --- --- 3.613457 ---
0.4655 1
South Africa -2.947249 --- --- -1.969893 --- ---
0.193 0.5957
Sudan --- -1.818223 --- --- 0.766281 ---
0.3657 0.9919
Swaziland -2.408333 --- --- --- --- 2.952535
0.369 0.9987
Tanzania --- --- 0.066397 --- --- 2.513588
0.6972 0.9959
Togo --- -2.009457 --- --- 3.411531 ---
0.2816 1
Uganda -2.035929 --- --- 0.405271 --- ---
0.5615 0.9985
Zambia --- -1.714749 --- --- -0.207161 ---
0.415 0.9282











Angola 1 65.04589   60.82525* 61.08191 61.33036 61.29871
Benin 1 59.01796   53.13798* 53.41621 53.29425 53.4752 53.4563
Botswana 3 56.79996 53.10932 51.53887   51.26956* 51.42566 51.48503
Burkina Faso 5 58.4101 52.47631 52.4094 52.47929 52.42003   52.33149*
Burundi 4 54.9739 51.09395 51.08966 50.60215 50.7993   48.80287*
Cameroon 4 66.18038 59.31541 59.29552 59.37723   59.29420* 59.46036
Cape Verde 5 53.83578 48.03968 47.94917 47.79819 47.83584 47.19315*
Central African Republic 2 57.70138 51.82192 51.66657* 51.67721 51.91383 52.00808
Chad 2 56.34759 51.86918   51.58911* 51.59107 51.87599 51.98441
Comoros 2 49.10077 47.56681   47.04315* 47.10223 47.42348 47.72986
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1 66.96584   60.17985* 60.25778 60.46067 60.39194 60.48324
Congo, Rep. 1 64.60588   58.73556* 58.99524 58.97791 59.03078 59.18288
Cote d'Ivoire 1 69.93079   61.01316* 61.25391 61.46517 61.63423 61.43831
Ethiopia 1 67.27956   59.17233* 59.22655 59.44438 59.40717 59.49182
Gabon 1 63.33886 56.77753* 56.8586 57.02978 57.11763 57.01459
Ghana 3 62.63613 57.0113 57.17993   56.98061* 57.0992 57.20622
Guinea 5 52.87013 51.83965 51.20944 51.53011 50.02591   49.86671*
Kenya 1 62.62166   57.41918* 57.48337 57.60961 57.74242 57.47448
Lesotho 5 53.84258 48.95713 48.81466 48.72064 48.31992 47.61636*
Madagascar 3 63.60052 56.96071 56.56978   56.54981* 56.62449 56.74801
Malawi 1 57.84775   53.59248* 53.70854 53.62647 53.67837 53.77108
Mali 1 58.02551   53.74326* 53.76506 53.86492 54.00584 54.09339
Mauritania 1 59.67996   53.70738* 53.86379 53.79478 53.77862 53.89383
Mauritius 5 57.6574 55.01974 55.15082 55.21511 54.26026 54.16202*
Mozambique 5 64.94886 60.7285 61.09734 60.78868 61.05444   60.35482*
Niger 1 61.03799   53.98449* 54.01775 54.18725 54.26026 54.2186
Nigeria 1 73.94842   65.72425* 65.87102 65.85311 66.01381 65.97814
Rwanda 4 57.23775 50.5377 49.96443 49.99531   49.96045* 50.13368
Sao Tome and Principe 5 50.99452 45.00003 45.18762 45.29096 44.9405   44.67878*
Senegal 3 63.27991 56.75866 57.01964   56.71182* 56.95935 57.08946
Seychelles 5 53.38006 49.22026 49.2389 49.28522 49.00122   48.83623*
Sierra Leone 5 59.85552 52.40124 52.20557 52.28525 51.84815 51.74648*
South Africa 1 65.39576   64.19554* 64.20962
Sudan 3 65.09472 59.83847 59.96585   58.65845* 58.87164 58.92385
Swaziland 1 53.50715   50.16308* 50.22783 50.35252 50.56591 50.56016
Tanzania 1 63.05911   59.55499* 59.69808 59.8258 59.95221 60.10048
Togo 5 57.67609 52.92992 52.83698 53.03329 53.21563   52.77714*
Uganda 5 61.24249 54.66958 54.73285 54.84918 54.68268   54.51543*
Zambia 5 65.18171 58.6589 58.52907 58.56407 58.5955   58.51420*
Zimbabwe 2 64.52373 57.99407   57.61713* 57.77172 58.05166 57.96917
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Ho: Capital flight does not Granger cause external debt (both in constant 2004 U.S. dollars)  Ho: External debt does not Granger cause capital flight (both in constant 2004 U.S. dollars)
H1: Capital flight Granger causes external debt (both in constant 2004 U.S. dollars) H1: External debt Granger causes capital flight (both in constant 2004 U.S. dollars)
12345 1 2345
Angola 9.86012 2.40157 5.25254 3.14043 3.14043 0.91892 0.2401 0.18814 0.09529 0.09529
0.0085 *** 0.1459 0.0408 ** 0.1871 0.1871 0.3567 0.7914 0.9007 0.9771 0.9771
Benin 0.36933 0.2754 0.02989 0.12082 0.22266 2.14555 0.58598 0.40728 0.21094 0.21464
0.5484 0.7616 0.9928 0.9732 0.9471 0.1545 0.5643 0.7494 0.929 0.9509
Botswana 0.03923 3.42332 2.87714 1.22627 1.13234 4.03257 2.98441 2.51735 1.60869 2.00166
0.8445 0.05 * 0.0617 * 0.3366 0.3884 5.51E-02 * 0.0704 * 0.0873 * 0.2178 0.1408
Burkina Faso 0.64342 0.72994 0.18582 1.28651 0.80686 8.90024 3.88997 2.35882 2.13335 1.92578
0.4288 0.4912 0.905 0.307 0.5596 0.0056 *** 0.0328 ** 0.0968 * 0.1124 0.1398
Burundi 0.5843 1.01619 0.46337 0.19307 0.1446 0.06413 0.93389 3.20647 1.92752 17.6641
0.4558 0.389 0.7141 0.9344 0.9714 0.8033 0.4179 0.0705 * 0.2107 0.0079 ***
Cameroon 2.69919 0.94708 1.4901 1.16319 0.73894 32.7008 10.4981 3.45147 2.09318 1.51566
0.1105 0.3999 0.2414 0.3539 0.6036 3.00E-06 *** 0.0004 *** 0.0317 ** 0.1161 0.2318
Cape Verde 6.55575 5.5425 2.5152 2.88357 3.10473 2.4242 2.43631 0.67963 0.93701 1.58411
0.0191 ** 0.0148 ** 0.1039 0.0794 * 0.0859 * 0.136 0.1192 0.58 0.4812 0.2796
Central African Republic 0.08831 0.64706 1.0135 0.69009 0.77568 4.50173 4.59906 4.11943 3.01101 2.467
0.7683 0.5312 0.4033 0.6066 0.5792 0.042 ** 0.0187 ** 0.0167 ** 0.0401 ** 0.0697 *
Chad 2.45865 9.78457 3.52369 2.35311 2.21922 5.0532 4.45925 4.24436 3.83458 3.08458
0.13 0.001 *** 0.0362 ** 0.1009 * 0.1197 0.034 ** 0.0243 ** 0.0196 ** 0.0243 ** 0.051 *
Comoros 0.24912 0.27105 0.74177 0.66001 0.99272 0.7135 0.45336 0.27523 0.1703 0.21884
0.6229 0.7656 0.5436 0.6314 0.4731 0.4078 0.6426 0.8423 0.9494 0.9455
Congo, Dem. Rep. 0.5278 0.1891 0.12965 1.32862 1.60533 3.55862 1.98848 1.64395 1.63923 1.21262
0.473 0.8287 0.9416 0.2906 0.2067 0.0686 * 0.1558 0.2045 0.2 0.3411
Congo, Rep. 0.37227 0.27213 0.2793 0.39859 0.44012 2.84754 1.30092 2.78653 2.48412 2.397
0.5464 0.7638 0.8398 0.8074 0.8147 0.1019 0.2888 0.0625 * 0.0748 * 0.0782 *
Cote d'Ivoire 7.72068 2.32159 1.6067 0.61508 0.7698 25.2863 7.16404 2.8619 1.97964 3.79361
0.0092 *** 0.1167 0.2129 0.6563 0.5831 2.00E-05 *** 0.0031 *** 0.057 * 0.1329 0.015 **
Ethiopia 1.69203 2.81052 2.10796 3.09202 2.86664 1.14748 0.87098 0.77171 2.52213 2.07969
0.2029 0.0772 * 0.1246 0.0367 ** 0.043 ** 0.2923 0.4296 0.5207 0.0701 * 0.1129
Gabon 0.00069 3.02488 1.66515 1.26224 1.19387 0.06702 0.20292 0.29637 0.36586 0.29466
0.9792 0.0712 * 0.2121 0.3307 0.373 0.798 0.818 0.8275 0.8289 0.906
Ghana 0.20252 0.23796 1.35047 1.02048 0.61023 0.02932 0.25841 0.18533 0.24334 0.27817
0.6558 0.7898 0.2807 0.4185 0.6932 0.8652 0.7741 0.9054 0.9106 0.9194
Guinea 9.11602 12.5846 5.50283 2.03099 2.18089 2.3574 2.46878 0.90276 0.623 0.9642
0.0086 *** 0.0011 *** 0.0201 ** 0.2089 0.2768 0.1455 0.1265 0.477 0.6632 0.5483
Kenya 1.01346 0.82752 1.4422 0.88089 0.32951 2.24605 1.93204 1.57575 1.43623 2.04099
0.3219 0.4475 0.2542 0.4914 0.8889 0.1441 0.1637 0.2201 0.2554 0.1185
Lesotho 5.22678 2.34229 3.13395 3.23165 4.71369 0.23006 0.29638 1.37401 4.03112 5.81986
0.0306 ** 0.1186 0.0484 ** 0.0382 ** 0.0098 *** 0.6355 0.7463 0.2795 0.0177 ** 0.0041 ***
Madagascar 0.53111 2.29838 2.72219 3.03766 2.08465 2.48476 5.46234 5.91981 3.50989 2.26434
0.4716 0.1191 0.0657 * 0.039 ** 0.1122 0.1251 0.0099 *** 0.0034 *** 0.0232 ** 0.0895 *
Malawi 1.97793 1.48669 1.14414 0.95808 0.74736 2.4945 1.66502 1.0944 1.60413 0.79803
0.1696 0.2434 0.3506 0.4499 0.598 0.1244 0.2074 0.3698 0.2087 0.5646
Mali 0.50291 0.03845 0.03926 0.0714 0.38027 4.15034 2.7089 2.45229 2.29271 1.38651
0.4835 0.9623 0.9894 0.99 0.856 0.0502 * 0.084 * 0.0868 * 0.0917 * 0.2735
Mauritania 2.11456 0.73513 1.95316 1.84436 1.50424 2.99816 2.71038 1.92145 1.30083 0.69207
0.157 0.4895 0.1506 0.162 0.2435 0.0944 * 0.086 * 0.1556 0.3052 0.6368
Mauritius 0.56912 0.45586 0.32529 5.53498 5.10374 5.66966 3.59107 3.12671 3.75203 3.54402
0.4577 0.6398 8.07E-01 5.40E-03 *** 0.0083 *** 0.0252 ** 0.0447 ** 0.05 * 0.0245 ** 0.0306 **
Mozambique 1.64668 1.04456 1.41763 1.10215 2.34709 0.45859 1.83967 1.13221 0.83534 0.78968
0.2166 0.3777 0.2899 0.4183 0.1854 0.5074 0.1953 0.3784 0.5393 0.5991
Niger 0.04237 0.58797 0.43903 0.32415 0.44921 2.54642 3.39852 2.67607 2.41095 3.31893
0.8383 0.5622 0.7271 0.8587 0.8086 0.1207 0.0477 ** 0.0689 * 0.0798 * 0.0254 **
Nigeria 0.19448 0.20073 0.55717 0.45125 0.84523 5.10441 3.04108 3.00081 1.23702 0.97302
0.6623 0.8193 0.6482 0.7704 0.5346 0.031 ** 0.0638 * 0.0495 ** 0.3242 0.4591
Rwanda 2.02666 4.2863 0.89888 1.84037 1.07149 15.7653 5.89725 3.44973 3.05951 1.95883
0.1645 0.0238 ** 0.4556 0.157 0.4069 0.0004 *** 0.0073 *** 0.0317 ** 0.038 ** 0.1315
Sao Tome and Principe 0.00698 0.06825 0.5141 0.43262 0.74998 1.88446 0.13123 0.45283 0.97502 1.63745
0.9341 0.9342 0.678 0.7829 0.603 0.1831 0.8778 0.7187 0.4521 0.23
Senegal 0.39126 0.12923 2.3703 1.51493 1.12006 7.42866 2.83599 3.35749 1.43381 1.00911
0.5369 0.8794 0.0995 * 0.2399 0.3913 0.0111 ** 0.0784 * 0.0382 ** 0.2634 0.4461
Seychelles 3.51459 2.90668 2.35019 4.96217 6.95684 0.09396 2.38311 2.57752 3.88556 2.36129
0.0755 * 0.0821 * 0.1165 0.0156 ** 0.0087 *** 0.7624 0.1224 0.0953 * 0.0332 ** 0.1342
Sierra Leone 0.28768 0.41833 0.18551 1.82811 1.40925 5.97816 2.1537 1.91803 4.60965 5.03507
0.5955 0.6622 0.9052 0.1594 0.2657 0.0204 ** 0.1349 0.1525 0.0074 *** 0.0042 ***
South Africa 0.0842 0.17525 0.0842 0.17525 0.17525 2.65752 5.0969 2.65752 5.0969 5.0969
0.7801 0.8454 0.7801 0.8454 0.8454 0.1471 0.0794 * 0.1471 0.0794 * 0.0794 *
Sudan 5.84195 1.93521 3.23563 2.0439 0.75924 1.58048 0.52098 4.05174 3.17105 2.27543
0.0217 ** 0.1632 0.0392 ** 0.1231 0.5901 0.2181 0.5996 0.0178 ** 0.0336 ** 0.0883 *
Swaziland 0.17204 0.11224 0.06419 0.53671 0.62782 0.05735 1.29393 0.52729 0.40637 0.92271
0.6816 0.8943 0.9782 0.7106 0.6814 0.8125 0.2926 0.6684 0.8016 0.4932
Tanzania 2.96027 1.86179 1.01059 1.08967 1.58393 9.56254 5.81079 3.1866 2.23815 2.2593
0.0977 * 0.1791 0.4098 0.3948 0.2327 0.0048 *** 0.0094 *** 0.0473 ** 0.1106 0.1098
Togo 0.61307 1.77176 1.6699 3.81722 4.21118 0.09585 0.895 1.44683 0.85434 0.39968
0.4404 0.1916 0.2039 0.0204 ** 0.0136 ** 0.7592 0.4218 0.2576 0.5096 0.8415
Uganda 0.04814 0.11808 0.13002 1.40166 2.4139 0.11397 0.37483 0.49686 0.75366 0.99989
0.8278 0.8891 0.9413 0.2662 0.0744 * 0.7379 0.6908 0.6878 0.5663 0.4444
Zambia 0.63449 0.08672 0.35694 0.58341 0.59836 30.9009 11.8708 8.05555 7.3741 6.05615
0.4318 0.9172 0.7845 0.6779 0.7017 4.00E-06 *** 0.0002 *** 0.0006 *** 0.0006 *** 0.0016 ***
Zimbabwe 0.75151 0.807 1.15984 0.7448 0.48184 16.601 4.64588 2.97198 2.05453 2.0262
0.3946 0.4596 0.3524 0.5764 0.7834 0.0004 *** 0.0213 ** 0.0593 * 0.138 0.1468
Annex Table 4
Granger Causality (No Vector Error Correction): External Debt and Stock of Capital Flight, interest rate adjusted (in constant 2004 U.S. dollars)
Number of lags Number of lags
Note: F-test results are given in the first line, the probability values are given in the second line. If the probability value is between 0.05 and 0.1, we reject H0 at 10 percent significance level (shown with *). 
If it is between 0.05 and 0.01, we reject H0 at 5 percent significance level (shown with **). If it is less than 0.01, we reject H0 at 1 percent significance level (***).    
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Ho: There is no causality
ECT       Dk Dd       Dk ECT and Dd  ECT       Dd Dk       Dd ECT and Dk 
         Dk          Dd
Angola 0.41788 0.241938 2.100584 2.415106 0.258223 1.945564





Burkina Faso 1.690029 1.042466 1.476567 0.335943 0.997546 0.73127
0.220058 0.431291 0.25293 0.719905 0.452146 0.649156
Burundi 18.17464 9.700535 11.8784 0.04823 0.473504 1.679934
0.021051 ** 0.045995 ** 0.03382 ** 0.953639 0.758544 0.359144
Cameroon 1.78101 0.488404 1.541656 1.906184 0.862715 1.149892
0.196901 0.744194 0.221229 0.177471 0.504936 0.374691
Cape Verde 2.591028 1.13606 1.411981 0.098271 2.283073 3.338429
0.222018 0.489187 0.422971 0.909204 0.264279 0.175028
Central African Republic 3.313143 4.444347 3.259323 0.160777 1.352639 0.98091
0.053629 * 0.022802 ** 0.028633 ** 0.852391 0.277568 0.436518
Chad 1.671093 3.726533 3.078471 4.631567 2.765113 4.765437
0.217488 0.045497 ** 0.044531 ** 0.024795 ** 0.091266 * 0.009199 ***
Comoros 0.008435 1.787062
0.991605 0.199297
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1.46002 2.161578 1.679773 1.585274 0.364603 1.906494
0.249989 0.153057 0.194843 0.223377 0.551001 0.15236
Congo, Rep. 5.13489 0.10384 4.696247 0.885712 0.421849 0.628224
0.0132 ** 0.749846 0.009467 *** 0.4245 0.521713 0.603312
Cote d'Ivoire 8.031642 0.034455 5.499269 2.280346 0.176117 2.519504
0.001832 *** 0.85413 0.004423 *** 0.1216 0.678053 0.079143 *
Ethiopia 1.193948 0.089862 2.922208 3.544607 4.353454 2.530034
0.31852 0.766649 0.052004 * 0.042962 ** 0.046509 ** 0.07827 *
Gabon 5.061177 0.328795 3.563467 1.788002 5.093416 4.672135
0.017298 ** 0.573095 0.033687 ** 0.194317 0.035988 ** 0.013118 **
Ghana 4.327609 0.308617 2.013637 0.590835 1.248252 0.779276
0.026683 ** 0.818884 0.118252 0.562812 0.317502 0.575721
Guinea 1.392675 0.090833 1.477657 2.347191 1.225476 12.32462
0.302707 0.914098 0.295306 0.15773 0.343349 0.001688 ***
Kenya 1.843394 0.106305 1.462066 1.426369 1.061386 1.87307
0.17765 0.746904 0.246991 0.257706 0.31204 0.157971
Lesotho 8.361762 2.142927 5.116942 5.957385 5.467525 4.651736
0.007337 *** 0.142799 0.010579 ** 0.019784 ** 0.011077 ** 0.01466 **
Madagascar 5.586807 3.352197 2.68249 2.325204 3.307464 2.750163
0.011338 ** 0.038385 ** 0.050144 * 0.122409 0.040028 ** 0.046073 **
Malawi 2.097858 0.913369 1.426669 1.348157 0.717045 0.957424
0.142275 0.347701 0.25671 0.276647 0.404558 0.426987
Mali 1.410611 0.948947
0.799564 0.912333
Mauritania 2.128951 1.410611 1.749266 2.163408 0.948947 2.623779







Nigeria 11.47962 0.038587 8.099936 0.127838 0.348233 0.716886
0.000247 *** 0.84574 0.000525 *** 0.880526 0.560022 0.55054
Rwanda 0.879677 0.81028 1.555964 0.726163 0.737219 0.884253
0.432014 0.534817 0.216968 0.497404 0.578677 0.526241
Sao Tome and Principe 1.984674 0.843194
0.175215 0.551788
Senegal 3.026643 0.517518 1.33384 1.8839 2.278258 2.427403
0.075091 * 0.675814 0.297232 0.182388 0.116322 0.07794 *
Seychelles 0.476943 2.225177 2.181923 1.211814 0.832623 1.521829
0.651971 0.229212 0.235178 0.387757 0.586724 0.359311
Sierra Leone 6.692795 3.544831 2.815403 0.768378 1.850073 1.721741
0.008365 *** 0.025794 ** 0.043803 ** 0.481179 0.16343 0.178361
South Africa 13.52634 7.316608 8.858546 0.371603 0.085616 0.984753
0.03481 ** 0.073479 * 0.055105 * 0.717491 0.788896 0.50489
Sudan 0.076698 3.877609 2.467992 4.510388 2.187926 3.064941
0.926428 0.023709 ** 0.065762 * 0.023462 ** 0.119563 0.03126 **
Swaziland 0.393667 4.557907
0.759155 0.016129 **
Tanzania 7.399259 0.450747 5.043122 5.829838 0.936972 5.406402
0.012823 ** 0.509299 0.016268 ** 0.009687 *** 0.344075 0.006467 ***
Togo 2.096576 0.843142 1.033536 3.0912 4.662829 7.456286
0.169276 0.546613 0.460832 0.08604 * 0.015723 ** 0.001889 ***
Uganda 2.649585 0.809018 1.315982 2.521046 1.617592 1.572878
0.103418 0.561032 0.308579 0.113792 0.215506 0.218052
Zambia 1.521122 3.233826 4.936607 0.973881 0.269668 0.531629
0.250326 0.035304 ** 0.004598 *** 0.400259 0.922692 0.79754
Zimbabwe 1.950167 1.80689 2.127996 1.96472 2.864882 3.156701
0.172788 0.194301 0.121722 0.170756 0.084676 * 0.041152 **
Annex Table 5
Granger Causality Test : External Debt and Stock of Capital Flight                                        
(in constant 2004 U.S. dollars, interest rate adjusted)
Note: F-test results are given in the first line, the probability values are given in the second line. For probability value between 0.05 and 0.1, we reject H0 at 10 percent significance 
level (shown with *); if it is between 0.05 and 0.01, we reject H0 at 5 percent significance level (shown with **); and when it is less than 0.01, we reject H0 at 1 percent significance 
level (***).    